Introduction
The possibility of market manipulation has received a lot of attention from practitioners and academics alike, while continuing to elude a satisfactory answer. The main challenge that explanations of manipulation face is to reconcile rational behavior by market participants with the notion that some of them are mislead sufficiently frequently to provide a proÞt opportunity. Some attempts to explain manipulation relax the rationality assumption (Benabou and Laroque (1992) ) while others apply to speciÞc market structures (Kumar and Seppi (1992) , Gerard and Nanda (1993) ). This paper shows that manipulation can occur when prices perform an allocational role. We model this by considering information contained in security prices as being useful to Þrm managers in their investment decisions (see Leland (1992) , Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley (1994) , Dow and Gorton (1997) , Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , and Dow and Rahi (2001) among others). Furthermore, information Þnds its way into prices through trades by (potentially) privately informed speculators. For example, when a manager sees declining stock prices, she infers that a speculator with bad information about the fundamental state of the economy may have sold shares. The manager therefore adjusts her expectations about future demand for the Þrm's output and reduces the level of real investment. A common view is that due to this allocational role, Þnancial markets increase the ex ante efficiency of real investment decisions, as they provide more information to managers (see, for example, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) ). However, as we show in this paper, this allocational role also opens up the possibility of asset price manipulation via trade. Suppose the speculator happens to have an existing short position. He then has an interest in depressing the stock price by short selling, even if he has no private information regarding the future state of the economy. The manager will think the lower price may reßect bad information about the state of the economy, and will reduce the level of real investment. This will in itself reduce the true value of the Þrm, generating a self fulÞlling expectation. The speculator will gain from having to pay a lower cost to cover the short position at a later date. Furthermore, the gain from such manipulation can be sufficiently high to justify establishing the short position in the Þrst place. We thus model manipulation via trade at three dates and the trader starts without an existing inventory in the stock.
Stock prices thus play two roles. On the one hand they sometimes contain information and improve resource allocation. On the other hand their allocational role gives rise to manipulation and consequently misallocation of resources. This raises the question whether Þnancial markets are desirable by contributing to ex ante production efficiency, as is commonly believed. We Þrst analyze this question in a framework where there is only one decision maker in the real sector, who may learn from prices. In this case, a
Þnancial market is at worst useless and sometimes desirable from the point of view of ex ante production efficiency. The intuition is that the manager can always choose to ignore the price signal, if she knows that, on average, her private information is more accurate.
This may no longer be true when there are several Þrms with production externalities.
When investment decisions are interdependent, the role of prices in guiding decisions changes in a fundamental way. We consider the case where there are positive spillovers from production in one Þrm to the productivity of another Þrm. We show that production externalities exacerbate the scope for manipulation, because the publicly observable price signal is now not only important as a source of information on an underlying parameter.
Instead, it also is an indication of the information that another Þrm manager may have received, which in turn is relevant for assessing what investment decision that other agent may take. The publicly observable price signal may thus become so important relative to the private signal as to lead agents to ignore their private signal, and follow the public signal even when they know it is manipulated. As a result, we can show that in the multiple-agents case, the existence of a Þnancial market may reduce the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions.
This last result demonstrates the importance of public signals in an environment where several agents have to make interdependent investment decisions; an issue investigated by Morris and Shin (2002) . They show that when there are strategic complementarities among economic agents, they might ignore their private signals, and take into account only a public signal, since this signal reveals information about what other agents know.
Their paper, however, does not consider the production of public signals, and does not show why they might be misleading. In this paper we discuss a mechanism for the production of public signals -i.e. a Þnancial market -and show how this mechanism can generate excess noise in the public signal as a result of manipulation.
Complementarities in the form of positive production externalities could be due, for example, to learning by doing or to the nature of the production technology itself. Positive spillovers of this kind have been identiÞed as an important explanatory variable in the endogenous growth literature (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . It also has served to explain the lack of convergence of economies starting from different initial positions, essentially due to multiple equilibria in the real sector of an economy (e.g. Matsuyama, 1991) . In addition, positive externalities have been used widely to improve our understanding of business cycle ßuctuations (e.g. Cooper and John, 1988) . In a recent paper, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) explore the effect of externalities on security prices and real value of Þrms. While we do not consider this explicitly here, our argument could also be applied to a single Þrm with network externalities. In this case a demand externality can produce positive spillovers between different customers of the Þrm, and stock price manipulation could be analyzed within our framework. We elaborate on this point in Section 6.B.
In our account of manipulation Þrm managers destroy Þrm value by taking the wrong investment decision in some states of the world. A manipulator may cause this destruction in value and proÞt from it, because he holds a short position in the Þrm. This drives an asymmetry between sell side and buy side speculation. Buy side manipulation cannot work in the same way, because only speculators with a short position can proÞt when managers take wrong investment decisions and destroy Þrm value. We do not claim that manipulation through long positions is impossible. However, as discussed further in Section 6.C, it does not occur naturally in the framework developed here.
Our model is related to the debate on short sales regulation and market manipulation.
For a long time now, Þrm owners and regulatory bodies have been suspicious of short sales.
The SEC introduced an 'up-tick' rule for short sales and requires short sales disclosure in order to minimize a perceived potential for value destroying 'bear raids'. 2 The SEC states:
"Although short selling serves useful market purposes, it also may be used as a tool for manipulation. One example is the 'bear raid' where an equity security is sold short in an effort to drive down the price of the security by creating an imbalance of sell-side interest. Many people blamed 'bear raids' for the 1929 stock market crash and the market's prolonged inability to recover from the 2 Short sales regulation was Þrst introduced in the Securities and Exchange Act, 1934, in response to the stock market crash in 1929. The rule has been updated since and been adopted by the NASD in its rule 3350.
crash." 3 These concerns are widely shared by Þrm owners in an ongoing debate with the SEC regarding whether short sales should be regulated in the OTC market for non-listed shares.
A number of companies are concerned that manipulative short sales are widespread and damaging to long-term shareholders. 4 In addition there are widespread allegations that market makers themselves engage in value destroying short sales activities. As one commentator puts it:
"The MMs [market makers] just keep selling the targeted companies stocks with the idea that they will never have to produce real shares. Their apparent goal is to force the company to fail by depriving it of working capital and discouraging investment." 5 While the allegations vary in the nature of the manipulation and the identity of the perpetrators, they share a number of features. Short sales are seen to be sometimes 'abusive' in nature and destroying Þrm value. This paper shows that these concerns can be justiÞed on theoretical grounds.
Related concerns over abusive and value destroying short sales exist in currency markets. George Soros (1994) Þnancial markets affect production efficiency.
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2002) show that uninformed agents can earn (risk adjusted) excess returns from trading when prices affect the real value of assets.
They focus on irrational traders who have wrong beliefs regarding assets values. Thus, their paper also identiÞes a mechanism for proÞtable trade in the absence of superior information. However, they address the question of whether irrational investors are necessarily driven out of the market place by accumulating trading losses. Instead, we focus on the possibility of manipulation by fully rational agents. 6 The Economist, 4th Sept. 1997. 
The Model
To begin with we study a model with a single Þrm employing a technology of uncertain productivity. The manager of the Þrm takes an investment decision I ∈ [0, K], so as to maximize the expected Þrm value, which is given by
where θ ω denotes the Þrm's productivity parameter and c its marginal cost of investment (we sometimes refer to θ ω as the fundamentals of the Þrm). Depending on the state of the world ω ∈ {l, h}, the productivity may be high or low (θ h > θ l ) with equal probability.
We assume that the investment is worthwhile undertaking when the state is high, but not when it is low, i.e.
Moreover, we assume that in the absence of information about realized productivity, it is worthwhile to undertake the investment:
There are four dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} in the economy. At dates t = 1 and t = 2, the equity of the Þrm is traded at publicly observable prices. There are three types of traders in the Þnancial market: A speculator, a noise trader, and a market maker. At date t = 3, before uncertainty regarding ω is realized, but after second period trade has been executed and prices been made public, the Þrm manager takes the investment decision based on her available information. All agents are risk neutral.
At time 0, the manager receives with probability β a fully revealing private signal s M ∈ {l, h}, concerning the productivity parameter θ ω . With probability 1 − β she receives no signal, denoted by s M = ∅. In this simple structure, the optimal investment level is always a corner solution I * ∈ {0, K}, i.e. either no investment is undertaken, or the Þrm invests up to its capacity constraint K. We assume that the manager uses retained earnings to Þnance investment. 8 At time 0, the speculator receives a perfectly informative private signal s T ∈ {l, h} with probability α (T stands for trader). With probability 1 − α he receives no signal, denoted by s T = ∅. Assume the speculator does not know whether the manager observed a signal, and vice versa.
While the speculator can trade in the equity of the Þrm, the manager is prohibited from doing so. In most countries trade by the manager would constitute illegal insider trading, since she has privileged information regarding her own future investment decision.
In addition to the speculator, there is a noise trader who submits orders n t ∈ {−1, 1}
with equal probability. The noise trader's orders are serially uncorrelated, i.e. n 1 and n 2 are independent. The speculator submits orders u t of the same size as the noise trader, or he does not trade at all, i.e. u t ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Following Kyle (1985) , in each round of trade orders are submitted simultaneously to a risk neutral market maker who sets the price and absorbs order ßows out of his inventory. The market maker sets the price equal to expected asset value, given the information contained in past and present order ßows. This assumption can be justiÞed by a competitive market making industry. The market maker can only observe total order ßow Q t = n t + u t , but not its individual components. Thus, possible order ßows
. At date t = 1 the price is a function of total order ßow
. At date t = 2, the price depends on current and past order ßows
As we noted above, at date t = 3, the manager uses the information contained in 8 Note that these retained earnings can be easily included in the expression for the Þrm value in (1), without changing the analysis. An equilibrium is deÞned as (i) a price and signal contingent trading strategy by the speculator {u 1 (s T ) and u 2 (s T , p 1 )} that maximizes his expected Þnal payoff, given price setting and the strategy of the manager, 9 (ii) a price and signal contingent investment strategy by the manager g(s M , p 1 , p 2 ) that maximizes expected Þrm value given price setting and the strategy of the speculator, (iii) a price setting strategy by the market maker {p 1 (Q 1 ) and p 2 (Q 1 , Q 2 )} that allows him to break even in expectation, given other strategies.
In the next section we show the existence of an equilibrium that features manipulation.
Manipulation in the One-Firm Model
If the Þrm manager receives a signal s M ∈ {l, h}, prices will not convey any further information relevant for the investment decision which will therefore be based on the signal alone. However, if the manager does not receive an informative signal (s M = ∅),
she may update her belief about productivity from observed prices. As a result, prices in the Þnancial market may have an effect on the manager's investment decision and the value of the Þrm.
As we show below, this feedback from prices to the real value of the asset, provides scope for proÞtable manipulation by the speculator. Manipulation here is deÞned as trading in the absence of private information for the purpose of affecting agents' beliefs, and making a positive expected proÞt. In this section, we discuss an equilibrium that features manipulation. The section is organized as follows: We Þrst summarize key features of an equilibrium with manipulation. We then state Proposition 1 that establishes conditions under which such an equilibrium exists. Then, we fully characterize and derive the equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the intuition behind the equilibrium, and its implications.
A. Key Features of Equilibrium with Manipulation
The speculator can receive good news (
As is standard in models of trade with asymmetric information, the speculator buys after good news and sells after bad news. In the trading equilibrium with manipulation discussed below, the speculator trades even if he has not received any information. In particular, in the Þrst trading round, he will sell in the absence of information with the aim of establishing an initial short position from which he can proÞt once he has driven down Þrm value through further short sales in the second round. Trade at the Þrst date can therefore be characterized by
Trade in the second round is again contingent on the original signal realization. In addition it is also contingent on realized prices or order ßow at date t = 1. 10 Note that since both noise trader and speculator either buy or sell one unit at t = 1, total order ßow at that date can take on the values Q 1 ∈ {−2, 0, 2}. In the equilibrium examined here, the speculator continues to trade in the same direction as his date 1 trade only when Þrst round trade did not reveal his order (Q 1 = 0). Otherwise the speculator stops
trading. An informed speculator trades again after Q 1 = 0 in order to gain more from his private information, which has not yet been revealed. The uninformed speculator after he established a short position in the Þrst round without revealing his order, can make a proÞt by selling again in the second round and driving down the price and the real value of the asset. If the speculator's Þrst round trade was revealed by total order ßow, he will not trade again in the second round, because the price already reveals all the information and therefore he cannot make a proÞt.
In the proposed equilibrium, trade at the second date is thus given by:
Finally, the manager's investment decision is contingent on her own signal realization s M ∈ {l, h, ∅} and observed market prices. It is clear that if the manager receives an informative signal s M ∈ {l, h} she will ignore prices and invest after good news and not invest after bad news. If she receives no information she may follow the price signal if it is sufficiently informative. This puts two constraints on the parameter space for which manipulation can be part of an equilibrium. Firstly, the manager must look at the price signal with a sufficiently high probability to make manipulation worthwhile. Secondly, the price signal must be sufficiently informative for the manager to want to follow it. These constraints are captured in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose the following conditions hold:
and
Then, there exists an equilibrium that features manipulation. The speculator's equilibrium trading strategy is given by (3) and (4).
We now provide a full characterization of the equilibrium i.e. prices and the manager's investment strategy. While the full proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix it builds on the derivation of equilibrium prices given below. Hence, the proof should be read after the equilibrium characterization in Section 3.B below.
B. Full Characterization of Equilibrium
Suppose that total order ßow in t = 1 is Q 1 = 2. The market maker knows that the speculator submitted a buy order and must have received a signal s T = h. Thus, the market maker will set a high price that reveals this information. Moreover, the price will also reßect the fact that the manager, after observing the high price, will realize that w = h and will undertake the investment. 11 Denoting the resulting price as p
we get:
In the proposed equilibrium, after the price p 1 = p + is announced, total order ßow in t = 2 can be −1 or 1. In either case, the order ßow in t = 2 does not reveal any new information on the value of the Þrm, and thus the price in t = 2 will be:
Now, suppose that total order ßow in t = 1 is Q 1 = −2. The market maker knows that the speculator submitted a sell order. The market maker does not know whether the speculator's sell order is driven by underlying information (s T = l with ex-ante probability α/2) or by a desire to manipulate the price (s T = ∅ with ex-ante probability 1 − α). He updates his belief about the probability that the state ω = l occurred using Bayes' rule:
Then, if the manager observes a price that corresponds to an order Q 1 = −2, she updates her belief regarding the productivity level to
Suppose α is sufficiently large, such that condition (6) in Proposition 1 holds. 12 Then, after observing a low price p 1 (−2), the manager is only willing to invest if she receives a private signal s M = h indicating that the productivity level is actually high. Therefore,
Using (9) we can write:
As for the subsequent price in t = 2, using the same argument as above, we get:
Now, suppose that total order ßow in t = 1 is Q 1 = 0. In this case, the market maker cannot identify the order of the speculator. The price in t = 1 will reßect the fact that orders are not revealing. This price will be calculated as a probability-weighted average of possible period-2 prices. Thus, in order to characterize p 1 (Q 1 = 0), we Þrst need to characterize the prices that will prevail in the second round of trade, given that Q 1 = 0.
If total order ßow in t = 1 is Q 1 = 0, total order ßow in t = 2 can be −2, 0, or 2.
Suppose that total order ßow in both periods is not revealing (Q 1 = 0, Q 2 = 0). In this case, the manager's updated productivity level is identical to the prior. By assumption (2), the optimal investment level is K at that point, unless the manager observed a low signal. The price in t = 2 will reßect this information. Thus, denoting the resulting price
, we get:
12 If this condition does not hold, the price that is determined in the Þnancial market will have no effect on the investment decision of the manager, and there will be no possibility of proÞting from manipulation.
If total order ßow in t = 2 is revealing of the speculator's order (Q 2 ∈ {−2, 2}), the price in this period will be set in the same way as a revealing price in t = 1. Thus, using the same argument as before, date t = 2 prices are given by:
Finally, the date-1 price p 0 ≡ p 1 (Q 1 = 0) is calculated as a probability-weighted average of date-2 prices. It can be written as:
Comparing the different prices, one can see that: p − < p 0 < p + . Thus, as the total size of the order ßow increases, the price set by the market maker increases as well.
Interestingly, we can also see that p 0 > p 0,0 . This is because period-1 price p 0 reßects the possibility that the speculator has information on the level of productivity, and that this information will be revealed in the second round of trade. Due to the allocational role of prices this leads to an increase in investment efficiency and therefore an increase in Þrm value. When period-2 price p 0,0 is set, it is clear that no information is revealed in the trading process and expected Þrm value is lower.
To conclude the description of the equilibrium, we show the investment strategy of the manager:
When the manager receives a fully informative private signal s M ∈ {l, h}, she ignores the price, and follows her signal: She invests when the signal is high, and does not invest when it is low. When her signal is uninformative s M = ∅, she will invest when the date-2 price is either intermediate (p 0,0 ) or high (p + ). She will not invest when date-2 price is low (p − ). This investment strategy follows directly from conditions (2) and (6).
C. The Source of ProÞts in Manipulation
The equilibrium just described has some standard features: A speculator will sell the stock of a Þrm, when he has private information implying that the fundamentals of the Þrm are bad (s T = l), and he will buy the stock, when he has private information that the fundamentals are good (s T = h). The private information of the speculator is then reßected in the price of the stock (a buy order can lead to a price p + , and a sell order can lead to a price p − ), and affects the decisions of the Þrm's manager. Thus, following the realization of a low price, the manager will decide not to undertake the investment if she does not have private information on the level of the fundamentals.
However, the equilibrium also has a non-standard feature: The speculator sells the stock when he does not have any private information. In this case, the market maker and the manager think the speculator may have private information on the level of the fundamentals, and as a result, the price sometimes drops to p − , and the manager may decide not to undertake the investment. This effect of the uninformed speculator on the price and on the real value of the Þrm is a manipulative effect, as the speculator does not have any private information on the fundamentals. The speculator is aware of the effect that his orders have on prices and real value, and this is why he chooses to trade without information. We now elaborate on this point by analyzing the expected proÞts and losses that the uninformed speculator incurs when he sells the stock.
An uninformed speculator, who follows the strategy in (3) and (4), faces three possible price paths, summarized in Figure 2 .
Firstly, with probability 1 2 , his sell order is revealed in the Þrst round (Q 1 = −2), and he will not trade again in the second round. In this case, the price in both rounds is low:
The speculator bears an expected loss of:
This loss reßects the cost of trading without any private information on the level of productivity. Thus, after the market maker observes a sell order, he pays the speculator a low price for this transaction, knowing that the sell order might be driven by bad information on the fundamentals of the asset. Since the speculator does not have information on fundamentals, the expected value of the asset given his information is higher than its price. In expectation he therefore closes out the short position at a loss. Second, with probability 1 4 , the order ßow of the speculator is not revealed in either of the two rounds (Q 1 = 0, Q 2 = 0). In this case, the price in both rounds is intermediate:
The speculator makes an expected proÞt of:
The source of this proÞt is the following: The price in the Þrst round of trade (p 0 ) reßects the possibility that the speculator has information on the level of productivity, and that this information will be revealed in the second round of trade and (due to the allocational role of prices) will increase the efficiency of the investment decision taken by the manager. The price is thus higher than the expected value of the asset from the point of view of the speculator, given that the speculator has no information on the level of productivity. As a result, the speculator makes an expected proÞt by short-selling the stock in the Þrst round of trade, and getting a price that is higher than the expected value.
Finally, with probability 1 4 , the order ßow of the speculator is revealed only in the second round (Q 1 = 0, Q 2 = −2). In this case, the price in the Þrst round is intermediate, and the price in the second round is low:
Here, the proÞt has three components. The Þrst component is identical to (17) . The second component is identical to (18) . The third component results from the manipulative effect that the speculator has on the price and on the investment decision of the manager:
When the manager observes a low price in the second round of trade, and does not have private information on the level of productivity, he will not undertake the investment.
Given that the speculator did not observe any signal on the fundamentals of the Þrm, the manager takes the wrong decision, and as a result, the expected value of the Þrm decreases. Then, the speculator makes a proÞt on his short position.
To sum up the discussion, in the above equilibrium, there are two sources of proÞts for the uninformed speculator. Both of these sources result from manipulation of beliefs that relies on the allocational role of prices. The Þrst source of proÞts (captured by (18)) is the manipulation of the belief of the market maker that the second-round price may reveal information on the fundamentals and promote the efficiency of the investment. The second source, which is the source we want to highlight in this paper (it is captured by the third term in (19)), is the manipulation of the belief of the manager that the investment is not worth undertaking. Here, the speculator establishes a short position in the Þrst round, and then drives down the price and the real value of the Þrm in the second round, making a proÞt on his short position. Importantly, the manipulative strategy of the uninformed speculator has a cost (captured by (17)), as the price decreases when his order is revealed.
Thus, the uninformed speculator loses when his order is revealed in the Þrst round, and gains only when he can establish the initial short position without being revealed.
We now analyze the conditions, under which manipulation is proÞtable. After summing up all the possible gains and losses, and multiplying by the probabilities, we Þnd that the uninformed speculator will proÞt from following the manipulative strategy when 
If this condition is not satisÞed, the manager observes information with a high probability, and the speculator becomes unable to proÞt from manipulating the price. In this case, the allocational role of the price becomes less important, and the scope for manipulation decreases. Interestingly, according to the above condition, when α increases, the speculator will be able to proÞt from manipulation under a lower range of values of β.
The intuition is that when α is higher, the cost of manipulation increases, as the market maker expects that order ßows will contain more information, and thus makes the price more sensitive to them. However, recall that in order to be able to manipulate the manager's beliefs, α must be above
(condition (6)). Thus, proÞtable manipulation will occur when α (which is a measure for the access of the speculator to information)
is high enough but not too high, and when β (which is a measure for the access of the manager to information) is not too high. The two conditions are illustrated in Figure 3 .
13 13 Note that Proposition 1 speciÞes another condition, but this condition is only important for the time consistency of the manipulation strategy and not for its overall proÞtability
Manipulation with Two Firms and Production Externalities
Let us now consider the case where, instead of one Þrm, there are two Þrms indexed by i ∈ {A, B} that display a production externality. Each Þrm is controlled by a different manager, who take the investment decisions simultaneously in t = 3. The value of production of Þrm i depends on the investment decision of Þrm j in a linear way:
Here, γ > 0 measures the degree of externalities between the two Þrms. Note that from linearity and risk neutrality it follows that optimal investment levels are again a corner solution I * ∈ {0, K}.
As before, trade in the Þnancial market occurs at t = 1 and t = 2. The traded security is a claim on the payoff of both Þrms combined. This setting can represent either a currency market, where the value of the currency depends on the value of production of several Þrms, or a stock market, where the trade is on an index of several Þrms (see also Section 6 for a discussion of currency speculation). Alternatively, we could assume that two separate claims on each Þrm are traded, but noise trade is perfectly correlated between the two assets. This could be, because noise traders hedge against exposure to the technology shock θ ω . Given that both Þrms are subject to the same fundamental uncertainty, hedging demand and therefore noise trade should be the same. Finally, the model's predictions are robust even if noise trade is allowed to differ between the two traded securities. However, the analysis would be considerably more cumbersome, because equilibrium trading strategies and investment would be contingent on a larger set of observable prices. This makes the exposition less neat. All that is needed for the analysis to go through is that in some states of the world the speculator can successfully affect the Þrm managers' beliefs even though he has no information. This also happens, albeit less frequently, when noise trade is not correlated across the two traded securities.
As before, there are three types of traders in the Þnancial market: A speculator, a noise trader, and a market maker with identical characteristics as in Section 3. Again, the productivity parameter θ ω is unknown and may equal either θ h or θ l with probability . At date t = 0, the speculator and each of the two managers may receive a perfectly informative signal regarding the future realization of ω. The probability of an informative signal is α for the speculator and β for each manager. The event of receiving a signal is independent across agents, and each agent does not know whether other agents observed a signal or not. We assume that the two managers cannot communicate with each other, and are therefore unable to coordinate their investment decisions.
As for the value of investment, we assume that even if the productivity level is high, a Þrm Þnds it optimal to invest only if the other Þrm does the same, i.e.
Moreover, assume that it is never worthwhile investing when productivity is low:
The deÞnition of equilibrium in this model is similar to the deÞnition in Section 2, except now each manager has to take into account the strategy of the other manager when maximizing the expected value of her Þrm. Thus, we have a sub-game played between the managers in t = 3 after the two rounds of trade. Because of strategic complementarities, this sub-game sometimes has multiple equilibria. In the following, we will assume that the managers always play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the sub-game between them.
In our model, this is the equilibrium that features most investment. The equilibrium of the sub-game will be part of the equilibrium of the model.
A. Key Features of Equilibrium with Manipulation
The speculator's trading strategy in the proposed equilibrium in this section is essentially identical to the one in Section 3. However, the managers' investment strategies are crucially different. In the presence of externalities, the managers use prices to learn about the underlying fundamental and about the other manager's likely behavior. This will cause them to ignore their perfectly informative private signals in some states of the world and exacerbate the problem of manipulation.
Given assumption (22) , the manager does not invest after observing a low signal and her behavior does not depend on the price. However, after observing a high signal, she will not always follow the signal and invest, since the proÞtability of the investment depends on the behavior of the other manager. This is a basic difference between the current model and the model in Section 3, in which the manager always followed her private signal. In the presence of externalities, the decision of the manager will depend on the price even when she receives a high signal. The manager looks at the price not to learn about the fundamentals, which she already knows, but to learn about the behavior of the other manager. This will be relevant, because even if one manager has received a high signal, she does not know whether the other manager also received this signal.
Instead, she may not have received any signal and therefore use the price to learn about fundamentals. When prices do convey fundamental information with sufficient reliability, the uninformed manager will not invest when the price is low. The likelihood of this outcome can be sufficient to deter the manager with good information from investing.
Thus, a speculator, who trades without information and drives down the price, can cause managers to avoid investments even when they get high private signals.
As in the previous section we Þrst provide conditions on the parameter space for which an equilibrium that features manipulation exists (Proposition 2). We then give a full characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose the following conditions hold:
Then there exists an equilibrium that features manipulation.
The formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix and builds on the equilibrium characterization given below.
B. Full Characterization of Equilibrium
The strategy of the speculator in t = 1 is given by:
The strategy in t = 2 is given by:
The strategy of the speculator is identical to the strategy we had in Section 3. There is only a notational difference, which is the superscript C that is added to prices, in order to denote the case of complementarities. We will add this superscript to all prices in this section.
Given the strategy of the speculator, the prices set by the market maker in equilibrium are: p C,− when current or past order ßow reveals a sell order from the speculator; p C,+ when current or past order ßow reveals a buy order from the speculator; p C,0 in period 1 when the total order ßow did not reveal the order of the speculator; and p C,0,0 in period 2 when the total orders in both periods did not reveal the orders of the speculator. The logic behind the price setting is similar to Section 3. We will compute the prices below, but beforehand we characterize the managers' equilibrium investment strategies:
From (22) it is clear that the manager will never invest when her signal is low. Moreover, she also does not invest when the price is low (p C,− ), regardless of her signal. When she observes a high signal or no signal, she will invest when the price is high (p C,+ ) or intermediate (p C,0,0 ). Table 1 illustrates this investment strategy as a function of the price in the second round of trade and the private signal of the manager. In order to ensure that investment strategy (28) is part of a Pareto dominating equilibrium in the sub-game played between the managers, we need to assume that conditions (23), (24), and (25) in Proposition 2 hold. Condition (23) says that a manager who did not get a private signal will never invest in equilibrium if the price is p C,− . In this condition,
is the expected level of θ given the price p C,− , and
is the expected probability that the other manager did not observe a low signal when the price is p C,− . (Note that when the other manager observed the low signal, she does not invest.)
Condition (24) states that a manager will never invest when the price is p C,− , even if she knows that the state is high (s i M = h), given that condition (23) holds. Here, β is the probability that the other manager observed the high signal given that the true level of the fundamentals is high. Thus, a manager who observes a high signal and a low price knows that the other manager will invest only if she observes a private signal, i.e. with probability β. When β is low enough, after observing a low price, a manager will not invest even if she knows that the fundamentals are good. Finally, condition (25) implies that a manager will choose to invest in the absence of information and at a 'medium' price (p C,0,0 ). Here,
is the expected level of θ, given the 'medium' price, and
is the probability that the other manager did not get a low signal, given this price.
The investment strategy in (28) demonstrates the most important difference between the model studied in this section and the model studied in the previous section. In the current model, managers sometimes ignore their private signals and follow only the public signal -i.e. the price. When a manager observes a high signal and a low price, she knows the fundamentals of the investment are good, and that the information conveyed by the price is manipulated. However, she still ignores her private signal and chooses not to invest, since she knows the other manager looks at the price, and thus will probably not invest. This happens although the two managers play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium; manipulation simply prevents an equilibrium with more investments. Thus, manipulation of prices here seems to be more damaging than in the one-Þrm model. This has implications on the effect of markets on the efficiency of investment decisions, a point we discuss further in the next section.
We conclude the description of equilibrium by characterizing prices:
The derivation of these prices is straightforward given the strategies of the speculator and the managers.
Financial Markets and Investment Efficiency
Financial markets can improve resource allocation, because prices reveal useful information. However, when prices are subject to manipulation this role of Þnancial markets is limited. This section analyzes the impact of manipulation on efficiency. In particular,
we will focus on resource allocation in the real sector, i.e. investment efficiency. Since the behavior of some agents (the noise traders) is not endogenized in the model, it is impossible to carry out a full welfare analysis of Þnancial markets.
In general, markets may provide insurance opportunities for risk averse agents. Manipulation will, of course, affect the opportunity set of agents trading for such motives.
The welfare implications are not immediately apparent. On the one hand, manipulation renders prices more volatile (in the sense that in some states of the world prices move, when otherwise they would not have), which should be bad for insurance based trade. On the other hand, manipulation renders prices less informative in equilibrium. Due to the Hirshleifer effect (Hirshleifer (1971) ) this may increase the amount of insurance available and thus be beneÞcial to insurance driven traders. A detailed analysis of the trade-off between the two effects is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
We appraise investment efficiency by comparing expected Þrm values when there is a Þnancial market to the ones when there is none. We start with the case of Section 3:
there is only one Þrm, and there are no externalities.
Proposition 3 In the case of one Þrm and no production externalities, the existence of a market for the Þrm's equity never reduces the ex ante efficiency of investment.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The Þrm manager uses prices to learn about productivity and thus take a better investment decision. If a market were to be harmful, this would imply that it is preferable not to follow the price signals, because more often than not they lead to the wrong investment decision. However, a Þrm manager can always choose to ignore the price signal. Whenever the level of manipulation in a market is so high as to render the price signal harmful in expectation, the manager optimally chooses to ignore prices. Thus, a market can at worst be useless, but never harmful.
We now turn to analyze the efficiency of investment decisions in the case of two
Þrms and production externalities (the case of Section 4). In order to have a meaningful comparison between the two regimes (i.e. with a Þnancial market in place and without a Þnancial market in place), we need to be careful in specifying the equilibrium that is played by managers in the sub-game in t = 3. As we noted in Section 4, the sub-game between the two managers sometimes has multiple equilibria, and thus we have to ensure that our results on efficiency of investment across the different regimes are not driven by the fact that we are comparing different types of equilibria with one another. In the following, we therefore stick to the assumption made in Section 4 and focus on the Paretodominant equilibrium. We assume that in each regime the equilibrium that is played by the managers in the sub-game in t = 3 is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
We also assume that conditions (22), (23), (24) and (25) hold, so that if a market exists, and the speculator engages in a manipulative strategy, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium between managers is the one described in (28) . If a market does not exist, in the Paretodominant equilibrium, managers always invest unless they observe a bad signal. This is a direct result of (25) .
Proposition 4
In the case of two Þrms and production externalities, the existence of a Þnancial market reduces the ex ante efficiency of investment for a non empty set of parameter values.
In the case of two Þrms and production externalities, a Þnancial market can reduce the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions, because it might cause valuable information to be ignored. In the absence of a Þnancial market, managers who play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium will always invest when they receive high private signals. However, when there are publicly observable market prices, a manager who observes a high private signal and a low price, will decide not to invest. This is because she knows the other manager also observed the price, and is thus not going to invest. A low price prevents managers from coordinating on a strategy of always investing when they observe positive private information. So why do Þrms not simply ignore the public signal when they know that it reduces overall investment efficiency? Even in this case there is a positive probability that a low price reßects bad information. A manager who has not received a private signal will thus want to follow the public price signal (under the restrictions discussed in Section 4).
If managers cannot commit to ignoring the price signal, there will be times when they follow it. Thus even though it would be better to ignore prices altogether, it is impossible to do so and Þnancial markets might reduce the ex ante efficiency of investment.
A Þnancial market reduces the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions under the following condition (derived in the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix):
An increase in α generates a smaller range of parameters, under which a Þnancial market reduces the ex ante efficiency of investment. The intuition for this effect is simple:
When α is high, a Þnancial market can contribute more to the efficiency of investment decisions, since in this case, the speculator has access to more information on fundamentals.
Thus a Þnancial market, which can transfer this information to the managers, becomes more valuable. An increase in β on the other hand generates a larger range in which a
Þnancial market reduces the efficiency of investment. When β is higher, managers have access to more information, and the ex ante value of investments in the absence of a Þnan-cial market increases. Thus, in this case, a Þnancial market is less effective in promoting the efficiency of investment decisions. Furthermore, when γ is higher, Þnancial markets are more likely to reduce the ex ante efficiency of investment. The reason is that when γ is higher, the externalities between the two Þrms are greater, and the negative effect of manipulation -preventing investments when the level of productivity is high -becomes more important.
14 Thus, we can conclude that Þnancial markets are more likely to reduce the efficiency of investment decisions when speculators in the Þnancial market have less private information, when managers have more private information, and when the externalities among different decision makers in the real sector are greater.
In Table 2 , we present two examples with sets of parameters that satisfy assumptions (22), (23), (24) and (25) . Under the Þrst set of parameters a Þnancial market enhances the ex ante efficiency of investment, under the second set it is reduced. Thus, the table demonstrates that for some parameter values Þnancial markets can actually reduce the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions. As we can see from Table 2 , the value of α plays a crucial role in determining the effect of Þnancial markets on the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions. Thus, an increase in α shifts the economy from a region, where a Þnancial market reduces the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions to a region where this market enhances it.
Parameters
Example 1 Example 2 θ h 10 10 θ l 7 7 c 16 16γ 1 1 K 7.9 7.9 β 0.1 0.1 α 0.2 0.1   E[V A + V B |no market] −E[V A + V B |market]   −0.112 0.005
Further Implications of the Model
In this section, three possible implications of our model are explored. Firstly, we discuss the relation of our model to foreign exchange markets, and outline its relevance for speculative attacks against currencies. Secondly, we discuss other types of complementarities, for which our model in Section 4 is relevant. Thirdly, we analyze the relation between manipulation and short sales. Finally, we consider the introduction of additional strategic traders into the model.
A. Foreign Exchange Markets
Speculative attacks against currencies of emerging markets received a lot of attention in recent years due to the Þnancial crises in Mexico (1994), South East Asia (1997-1998), and many other places. These attacks often led to sharp depreciations and caused damage to production and output. The literature on currency attacks has identiÞed some factors that may cause an attack, namely: Fixed exchange rate regimes, limited reserves, and banking problems. (See, for example: Krugman (1979) , Obstfeld (1996) , and Chang and
Velasco (2001)). The model presented in this paper suggests another mechanism that might generate a currency attack. This mechanism is based on factors largely ignored by this literature: Asymmetric information, learning, and the microstructure of the foreign exchange market. Importantly, while most of the literature on currency attacks deals with
Þxed exchange rate regimes, this model shows that speculative attacks against currencies can occur also in a ßexible exchange rate regime as has happened for example in South Africa in 2001 or Malaysia in 1997-98.
Our model, applied to the context of currency markets, suggests the following mecha-nism for currency attacks in emerging markets: In the foreign exchange market, there are large traders, who may have superior information on the fundamentals of the economy.
Because of trade, this information is reßected in the level of the exchange rate. (Following bad information, the value of the local currency will depreciate.) In the real sector of the economy, there are investors (in emerging markets, these are very likely to be foreign investors), who have to decide whether to make real investments or not. These investors use the information that is conveyed by the level of the exchange rate to learn about the fundamentals of the economy before they make the investment decisions. Thus, when they see depreciation of the local currency, they are more likely to decide not to invest.
Finally, the investment decisions in the real sector affect the value of the currency, as the currency represents a claim on the real value of production in the economy. (As a result, when production falls, the value of the local currency will depreciate.) As we showed, this set-up creates scope for manipulation: Uninformed traders can establish short positions, hoping to generate depreciation. This depreciation will be accompanied by reduction in investments and output.
Evidence from several recent episodes show that manipulation may be relevant in the context of foreign exchange markets. During the Asian crisis, for example, the authorities in Hong Kong chose to intervene in the stock market, claiming that the currency was being manipulated by large traders with short positions in the stock market. More recently, the South African Rand was sharply depreciated, leading to an investigation on the possibility of manipulation (see Section 1). Moreover, a recent paper by Cheung and Chinn (2000) reports that many participants in foreign exchange markets believe that there are large traders in these markets, who have market power, and sometimes trade in a manipulative way. This survey was held among traders in large foreign exchange markets (for example, Dollar-British Pound), and thus, as Cheung and Chinn suggest, it is reasonable to believe that the phenomenon of large traders and manipulation will be even more apparent in smaller markets.
The existence of manipulation in foreign exchange markets may have some interesting policy implications. As we showed in Section 4, in the presence of externalities between investors, the efficiency of investment may be higher in the absence of a Þnancial market. These externalities may be very relevant in the context of emerging markets, since investment in infrastructure and learning by doing are very important in the early stages of development. Thus, in these markets, governments may want to consider the possibility of intervention in order to (i) deter manipulation, or to (ii) reduce the information contained in prices. In the context of foreign exchange speculation this might be achieved for example by Þxing the exchange rate. An analysis of such policy responses is left for future research.
B. Other Types of Complementarities
The model discussed in Section 4 focuses on two Þrms that display a production externality. This model can also be forumlated in the context of one Þrm with strategic complementarities between different agents associated with it. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) discuss the importance of such externalities for the feedback from stock prices to real Þrm value. For example, suppose that a Þrm, whose stock is publicly traded, produces a product that displays network externalities, i.e. the utility gained from using the product is increasing with the number of agents who use it. The Þrm has several potential customers, who have to make a decision on whether to buy the product or not. Clearly, there are strategic complementarities between the different customers, since the incentive of each to buy the product increases with the number of customers who do the same. Now, assume that customers face uncertainty regarding product quality. In the Þnan-cial market, there are agents who may have private information about product quality and who trade on that information. Then, customers will look at the Þrm's stock price before making a decision in order to learn about product quality. In turn, the price will affect their decisions, and will thus affect the value of the company. This set-up creates the same scope for manipulation as the model we described in Section 4, and thus can generate the result that the existence of a Þnancial market sometimes destroys value.
The scenario just described is very relevant for many types of companies. For example, internet companies, who develop new websites: The value of using this website for an individual consumer is probably increasing with the number of people who use this website.
Another example is telecommunication companies, who invest in cellular networks.
This story can also be told with other types of decision makers, like suppliers or work-ers. Thus, it is reasonable to think that in some companies there are complementarities between workers: The beneÞt from working with the Þrm for a skilled worker increases with the number of skilled workers who work with the Þrm. This is because when more skilled workers work for the Þrm, the value of the product increases, and the Þrm is more likely to pay high salaries in the future. In other companies, there might be complementarities between suppliers.
C. Short Sales
In our model, short sales have a very important role in generating manipulation. The speculator manipulates the price by short selling the stock, and then driving down its real value to beneÞt on his short position. This begs the question whether short sales are indeed crucial for manipulation, or whether one can generate examples of manipulation without short sales.
A key point in our model is that when the speculator trades without information he misleads the manager, and causes her to make mistakes in her investment decisions.
This, in turn, reduces the value of the Þrm. As a result, the speculator can make a proÞt from such a strategy only when he Þrst establishes a short position. Thus, a strategy in which the speculator establishes a long position, and then proÞts by increasing the real value of the Þrm cannot be easily implemented, since by trading without information the speculator can only reduce the value of the Þrm and not increase it.
Thus, our analysis suggests that there is a genuine asymmetry between speculative long and short positions in terms of the scope for manipulation. As a result regulator's concern with speculative short sales (and lack of concern with speculative long positions)
may not be entirely misplaced. Our model suggests that there is a real question as to whether restrictions on short sales are desirable, because they may deter value destroying manipulation. This ignores the issue of implementability of such regulation.
D. Additional Strategic Traders
Throughout the paper it is assumed that there is one speculator and one noise trader who submit orders to the market maker. This raises the question of whether manipulation is affected by the presence of further agents who can submit orders to the market maker.
Since the speculator can make a trading proÞt even if he does not have any information, one may expect that any strategic trader could make a proÞt without information by following the same trading strategy as the uninformed speculator.
This, however, is not the case. A key difference between the speculator in our model and any other uninformed strategic trader is that our speculator is potentially informed:
He sometimes has information about the fundamentals of the asset and sometimes not.
As a result, his orders depend on his information, and affect the price that is set by the market maker and the behavior of the managers. Other strategic traders that try to mimic the behavior of the speculator and never have information will not be able to make a proÞt for two reasons: One, their order ßows will be independent of any signal. If they choose a pure strategy for trading their orders will be detected by the market maker in equilibrium, and will therefore not have any effect on prices and on Þrms' investments.
Two, if they choose a random trading strategy they may affect prices. It means, however, that they sometimes need to buy. In this case they make a large loss with high probability. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates the possibility of proÞtable trading strategies that are not based on private information. The ability of a speculator to affect the real value of an asset via changing its price is identiÞed as a mechanism, which allows such manipulative trading to be proÞtable. Importantly, the model endogenizes (i) optimal trading strategies, (ii) price determination and (iii) the channel through which prices affect real asset value in a setting where all agents are fully rational. Moreover, it is shown that the problem of manipulation is exacerbated when the real sector consists of several decision makers with positive spillovers. In that case, shutting down a Þnancial market may actually increase the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions in the economy, even though prices may contain information that is useful for decision makers. The analysis thus provides a basis for a discussion of policy implications of manipulation for short sales regulation in stock markets. Similarly, future research may be able to further investigate optimal exchange rate policy in light of the possibility of manipulation in currency markets.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
In the main text, it is shown that (16) constitutes an equilibrium investment strategy, given the speculator's trading strategy. It is also shown that the equilibrium prices set by the market maker reßect the asset expected value given the strategies of the speculator and the manager. In order to show that the proposed set of strategies constitutes an equilibrium, we show that the speculator's strategy is optimal given the price setting behavior. This is shown using backward induction -starting from period 2 and going back to period 1. We start by analyzing the optimal trading decision of the speculator at date t = 2 for each feasible order ßow Q 1 ∈ {−2, −1, 0, 1, 2}. We use the notation Π 2 (s T , Q 1 , u 1 , u 2 ) to denote the total proÞt (i.e., proÞt from two rounds of trade) that the speculator makes for each date-2 order, given his signal, and the order
Throughout the proof we specify the market maker's and the manager's beliefs off the equilibrium paths that support the proposed equilibrium. Essentially, the assumption made for off-the-path belief updates is that deviations are taken to originate from an informed speculator. The signal realization that is believed to obtain is the one consistent with the observed direction of trade. If total order ßow does not allow an inference over the direction of trade (i.e. when Q 2 = 0) it is assumed that the new belief about the signal requires the least change in beliefs (i.e. when Q 1 = −2 and Q 2 = 0 then the belief is that the deviation is due to a speculator with a low signal s T = l).
Case 1:
If Q 2 ∈ {−1, 1}, i.e. the speculator does not trade at date t = 2, prices are given by their equilibrium values:
If a deviation occurs, the following beliefs obtain: if Q 2 = 2, it is believed that the deviation is due to a speculator with good information. If Q 2 ∈ {−2, 0} it is believed that the deviation is due to a speculator with bad information. Hence, p 2 (Q 1 = −2, Q 2 ∈ {−2, 0}) = 0, and
backward induction, and specify the market maker's beliefs off the equilibrium path. We start by analyzing the actions of the trader in period 2, given the outcomes in period 1.
We use the notation Π C 2 (s T , Q 1 , u 1 , u 2 ) to denote the total proÞt (i.e., proÞt from two rounds of trade) that the speculator makes in the case of complementarities, for each date-2 order, given his signal, and the order ßows at t = 1.
Suppose that the order ßow in period 1 was Q 1 = −2. The equilibrium price in period 2 is: p Suppose that the order ßow in period 1 was Q 1 = 0. Equilibrium prices are: To sum up, we showed that in equilibrium, the traders will choose the strategies in (3) and in (4) . As a result, we showed the existence of an equilibrium with manipulation.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Knowing the outcomes of the equilibrium strategies described in Section 3, we know that the ex ante expected value of production in the economy when a Þnancial market exists is: Suppose on the other hand that she receives a signal s T = l, which also happens with probability α/2. The speculator will sell and her sale will be revealed at either date with probability 3/4. With probability 1/4 the price will be non-revealing, in which case each manager invests unless she receives a low signal which happens with probability β.
Expected Þrm value is therefore:
Finally, the speculator may not receive any information (probability 1 − α) and sell. The 
Comparing (30) to (31) One can show that this condition does not contradict any of the conditions that establish the equilibrium in Section 4, as the Pareto optimal equilibrium given a Þnancial market (i.e., conditions: (22), (23), (24) and (25)). Thus, we have shown that there exists a non-empty set of parameter values for which the existence of a Þnancial market reduces the ex ante efficiency of investment decisions.
